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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
MCCLAIN V. STATE: THE TRANSCRIPT OF A WITNESS'S
TAPED STATEMENT IS ADMISSIBLE AS A PRIOR
INCONSISTENT STATEMENT ABSENT AN EXPRESS
FINDING OF INCONSISTENCY, AND MAY BE SENT TO THE
JURY ROOM PURSUANT TO MARYLAND RULE 4-326
WITHOUT A REQUEST FROM THE JURY.
By: Kristine L. Dietz
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a trial court could admit
into evidence the transcript of a witness's prior recorded statement
without making an express finding that the statement was inconsistent
with the witness's testimony. McClain v. State, 425 Md. 238, 40 A.3d
396 (2012). The court further held that the taped statement was not a
deposition under Maryland Rule 4-326 because it was not made under
oath, and therefore could be sent to the jury room absent the jury's
request. Id. at 253-54, 40 A.3d at 405-06.
In June 2004, Detective Ciraolo questioned Elliott McClain
("McClain") regarding the shooting death of Tidell Harris ("Harris").
McClain told Detective Ciraolo that he was at Sooner's Bar on the night
of the shooting; he observed Harris enter the bar and leave a short time
later. McClain informed Detective Ciraolo that sometime after the victim
left, he heard gunshots outside and told Sheila Billings ("Billings"), a
server, to call the police. Months later, Detective Ciraolo conducted a
taped interview of Billings. Billings indicated that McClain left the bar
prior to Harris being shot.
At trial, Billings testified as a witness for the State. Contrary to her
prior statement, she answered in the affirmative when asked if McClain
was still in the bar when the shooting was reported. The State attempted
to show Billings a transcript of her prior interview, but defense counsel
objected to giving Billings anything to refresh her recollection. The court
overruled the objection, and allowed Billings to look at her prior
statement. In overruling the objection, the court referenced both
refreshing Billings's recollection and the inconsistency between her
testimony at trial and her statement to Detective Ciraolo. Subsequently,
Billings stated that the transcript refreshed her recollection and testified
that McClain left the bar before a witness reported the shooting. The
circuit court admitted the taped statement into evidence and it was played
for the jury.
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The State, citing Maryland Rule 4-326(b), requested that the court
send the audiotapes to the jury room during deliberations. In granting the
State's request, the circuit court found that the prior statement was
admitted either as a prior inconsistent statement, or a consistent statement
used to rehabilitate Billings's credibility after cross-examination pursuant
to Maryland Rules 5-802.1(a) or (b), respectively. The jury found
McClain guilty of first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and
related handgun offenses. On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland affirmed the convictions. The Court of Appeals of Maryland
granted McClain's petition for a writ of certiorari.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland began its analysis by focusing on
whether a circuit court may admit a witness's taped statement into
evidence as a prior inconsistent statement without making an express
finding on the record that the statement qualified as a hearsay exception.
McClain, 425 Md. at 246, 40 A.3d at 400. As an initial matter, the court
rejected the possibility that Billings's prior statement was admitted under
a theory of refreshed recollection. Id. at 248, 40 A.3d at 401. Instead, the
court presumed the circuit court understood that Maryland Rule 5-612
specifically disallowed the taped statement to be offered into evidence
under this theory. Id. at 248, 40 A.3d at 401 (citing Germain v. State, 363
Md. 511,534,769 A.2d 931,944 (2001)). The court reasoned that the
circuit court removed any doubt as to the basis for admission by explicitly
explaining that the statements were offered into evidence pursuant to
Maryland Rule 5-802.1(a) or (b). McClain, 425 Md. at 248,40 A.3d at
402.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland explained that a statement is
admissible under Maryland Rule 5-802.1(a) if the prior statement is both
inconsistent and recorded in verbatim fashion by electronic means.
McClain, 425 Md. at 249, 40 A.3d at 402. Billings's statement to
Detective Ciraolo months after the murder was contrary to her initial
testimony at trial, and was therefore inconsistent. Id.
Billings's
statement was also audiotape-recorded and thus satisfied the second
requirement of Maryland Rule 5-802.1(a). Id.
The court ruled that the circuit court was not required to make express
findings on the record, and that the requirements of Rule 5-802.1(a) were
met. McClain, 425 Md. at 252, 40 A.3d at 404. Specifically, the court
rejected McClain's reference to case law that held the circuit court was
required to make an express finding of whether a witness's inability to
remember was genuine or false. Id. at 251-52, 40 A.3d at 403-04 (citing
Corbett v. State, 130 Md. App. 408,426-27, 746 A.2d 954, 963 (2000)).
Unlike in Corbett, Billings was able to remember, and therefore it was
not necessary for the circuit court to make a "demeanor-based credibility
finding." McClain, 425 Md. at 252, 40 A.3d at 404. The record itself
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was enough to establish the inconsistency between her testimony and her
taped statement. Id.
Finally, the Court of Appeals addressed whether the circuit court
abused its discretion when sending Billings's taped statement to the jury
room. McClain, 425 Md. at 253, 40 A.3d at 404. The court examined
Maryland Rule 4-326(c), which allows the court to provide the jury with
any testimony or other evidence they request. McClain, 425 Md. at 25354, 40 A.3d at 405. The court found that Maryland Rule 4-326(c) only
applies where the jury requests testimony or other evidence that has not
been admitted as an exhibit. Id. at 254, 40 A.3d at 405 (citing Adams v.
State, 415 Md. 585, 599-600,4 A.3d 499,507-08 (2010». Because the
circuit court admitted the audiotapes into evidence as exhibits, it was
irrelevant whether the jury requested the tapes. McClain, 425 Md. at 254,
40 A.3d at 405. The court held that Maryland Rule 4-326(b) controlled,
which allows all exhibits, except depositions, into the jury room unless
"good cause" exists to withhold them. Id. at 253, 40 A.3d at 405.
The court rejected McClain's argument that taped statements qualified
as "depositions" because Billings was not placed under oath as required
by Maryland Rule 2-414(a). McClain, 425 Md. at 255, 40 A.3d at 405.
Instead, the court focused on the "good cause" provision, and concluded
that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in determining that there
was not "good cause" to withhold the tapes from the jury. Id. at 255, 40
A.3d at 406.
The dissent believed that because Billings did not persist in testifying
inconsistently, the statement was not inconsistent, and there were no
grounds for admission under Maryland Rule 5-802.1 (a). McClain, 425
Md. at 271, 40 A.3d at 415 (Bell, C.J. dissenting). In response to the
dissent's concern, the majority emphasized that although Billings did not
persist in testifying inconsistently, her initial testimony could have
influenced the jurors, and therefore must be considered inconsistent. Id.
at 250, 40 A.3d at 403.
In McClain, the Court of Appeals of Maryland broadened the scope of
statements that might be admissible under the "inconsistent statement"
hearsay exception. As a result a trial court does not need to make an
express finding of inconsistency to admit a witness's prior recorded
statement. Favoring statements that aid in the evaluation of testimony,
the court created a potential loophole for clever practitioners to admit
evidence that has been used to refresh a witness's recollection under the
guise of an inconsistent statement. This ruling has the potential to render
the limits of Maryland Rule 5-612 insignificant if the items used to
refresh a witness's memory can otherwise be admitted as substantive
evidence.

